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Hell Hath No Fury like a Woman Scorned:  
Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers 
 
Introduction 
On November 6, 2008 a female suicide bomber detonated herself in North Ossetia, a 
predominantly Christian area of Georgia, killing 12 people and wounding around 40 others. 
Some asserted that the Islamic Chechen terrorist organization must be responsible for the killings 
(Schwirtz 2008).i No group claimed responsibility for the attack, however, nor was any logical 
explanation given. This made the act seem like a senseless suicide rather than a possible assault 
against an enemy. Once the state-centric war between Georgia and Russia over oil and territory 
had ended, terrorism no longer seemed advantageous to either the Georgian or the Russian cause. 
Therefore, one wonders what an unknown woman, intent on committing suicide with no obvious 
partisan motivations, was doing in the middle of two destructive armies.  
The presence of female suicide bombers creates disquietude among onlookers, as our 
perceptions of women more often revolve around humanity and kindness. We view women as 
the givers of life rather than the takers of it. Female terrorism is also disturbing, given the 
stereotypes of women as being driven by strong emotions, such as anger, aggression, feminism, 
or even nationalistic ambitions, even when these emotions have no bearing on a woman’s 
decision to become a suicide bomber.  In other words, many judge female terrorists’ motivations 
as neurotic, assuming that Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned. 
Terrorism has existed for centuries and until recently has been considered a male-
dominated form of warfare, where women have been used only in support roles. Today, 
however, given the misperceptions of women’s capacity for inflicting terror, women are no 
longer serving only as supporters of their male counterparts in sub-state warfare; rather, they are 
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taking lead roles in attacks with often little assistance from terrorist groups. Women no longer 
take a backseat to violence and terror; they have tactical advantages to commit suicide attacks, 
and in a militaristic environment, they are unexpected and therefore surprising perpetrators of 
murder.   
Objective of the Study 
This research attempts to assess the motivations of Palestinian female terrorists, hoping to 
contribute insight into the rise of female suicide terrorism in Israel and, by extension, in Iraq. 
Media portrayals and often policy initiatives address female suicide bombings as the exception 
rather than the rule especially in cases related to radical Islam. I argue, however, that due to the 
deadly impact of female suicide bombings, and the rising number of female participation in 
terrorism, female and male terrorism is equally deadly. If women are still unanticipated actors in 
terrorism, a few female suicide bombers may have a stronger impact on civilians than several 
male terrorists. I strongly believe that the rise of female participation in Palestinian terrorism 
needs to be addressed. In fact, female terrorism is a security issue that not only threatens Israeli 
forces, but threatens American military forces in Iraq. These women are still unanticipated 
perpetrators of terror and yet their participation in suicide attacks has been on the rise. I further 
argue that the case of Palestinian female terrorism needs to be assessed within the context of 
Arab/Muslim culture. Given that motivations of women may dramatically differ from those of 
men, if male oriented counter-terrorism strategies are initiated this may actually serve to 
exacerbate female terrorism. Thus this research does not generalize all terrorist actions into one 
motivational cause or cultural influence; nor does it characterize fundamentally non-Western 
motivations in Western terms.  Rather, it analyzes the act of Palestinian female participation in 
the context of its own social norms and values. In order to approach this research question, I first 
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analyzed literature on the topic of female involvement in terrorism and then the role of Islamic 
women in the Palestinian Territories. This gave me a sense of the most common assumptions of 
female participation in terror, their motivation and socially constructed ideas. In fact, I traveled 
to Israel to meet with Israeli terrorism experts in order to understand the latest theories involving 
female terrorism in Israel and Iraq. In doing so, I have developed one neglected explanation for 
the phenomenon of female suicide bombers.  
Historical Background of Terrorism 
Terrorism is a vicious part of sub-state warfare, compromising our sense of security and 
instilling panic. Terrorism is still used today because it has proven itself effective for centuries. 
In the 1st century AD the Zealots were a Jewish political movement who incited their people to 
fight against the Roman Empire by way of political stabbings. The most violent group of Zealots 
were the Sicariis, who were known for killing Jews opposed to their call for war against Rome. 
Moreover, following the death of the prophet Muhammad, the first duly recorded terror attacks 
were practiced by a Shiite Islamic sect called Ismailis-Nizari, also known as the Assassins 
(Knight 141, 2005).ii In modern times, between 1968 and 2003 there have been more than 6,100 
transnational terrorist attacks, causing more than 36,000 deaths and injuries (Nicholas et al. 
2003).iii Terrorism is an effective political tool of the weak because it threatens human security 
and instills panic among the masses. Therefore, the objective of sustaining human security for 
any liberal democracy is difficult, considering that terrorists do not follow the most basic moral 
and legal norms because they often consider all civilians targets.  
In response to this predicament, the United States often looks to other liberal democracies 
like Israel, a country that has substantial counter-terrorism experience, to create useful policies 
that can thwart terrorism at home and abroad. U.S policymakers and analysts have much to learn 
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from Israel as they struggle with the difficulties of terrorism (Byman 2006, 1).iv Israel has dealt 
with constant war since its creation in 1948, when the surrounding Arab countries united to 
thwart Jewish settlement and statehood. Two armed political uprisings, or intifadas, against 
Israeli rule were initiated by Palestinian terrorist organizations in the 1990s that employed 
suicide terrorism and created panic among Israeli citizens. Islamic terrorism in Israel is 
relentless, lending itself to study by other countries like the United States who are searching for 
new anti-terrorism policies. Because the perpetrators of suicide bombings are as diverse as the 
countries from which they come, it is important to analyze the motivations of each person or 
group, respective to their own cultural influences, so as to not miscategorize terrorist 
motivations.  
Along with many before him, Ariel Merari, a respected Israeli terrorism expert, has 
attempted to define terrorism. Despite the ambiguities of countless alternative definitions, Merari 
broadly defines terrorism. Merari’s concept of terrorism, in modern usage, is most commonly 
associated with sub-state guerilla warfare where, “certain kinds of violent actions are carried out 
by individuals and groups rather than by states, with events which take place in peacetime rather 
than as part of a conventional war” (Merari 1993, 213).v Merari has given a definition to a 
concept that is commonly misunderstood. In doing so, he still maintains a broad definition of 
terrorism and does not include important factors including motivations (whether political, social, 
or personal) and outcomes. More importantly, Merari does not differentiate between criminal 
attacks and terrorist attacks. For the purposes of this research, in conversation with Dr. Edward 
Crenshaw, I define the concept of terrorism as the use of lethal violence by clandestine 
individuals/groups against symbolic targets, usually civilians, in order to induce political 
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outcomes (via psychological coercion) from a real (and typically much larger and more 
powerful) population. 
 Acts of terrorism are not associated with any one culture; terrorist organizations are 
found on every populated continent, and numerous states are subject to their attacks. The 
motivations of terrorist groups are rarely the same, nor are the influences that drive them to 
terror. Thus, one cannot associate the motivations of a group like Al-Qaeda with that of the 
Tamil Tigers. In his work, Ariel Merari categorizes the different variables that make up 
terrorism. Indeed, he separates the variables of terrorism into situational factors, the idea of chain 
suicide, the effect of audience, personality factors, changes over time, perpetrating organizations, 
age, geographical location, and finally gender. After mentioning gender, Merari notes that in 
Lebanon during the 1980s, thirty-six people were suicide perpetrators, thirty males and six 
females. Merari states that the variable of gender needs further study even though, 
“Undoubtedly, the great majority of the members in the groups under consideration are males. 
However, because the distribution of members by sex in these groups is unknown, it is 
impossible to assess “gender proneness” to suicidal terrorism (Reich 1990, 192).vi
Women in Terrorism 
Traditionally, women have been perceived as victims of violence rather than perpetrators 
of it.  
Figure 1 
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Female Terrorists as a Percentage of Total (1978-2004)
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Figure 1 depicts female terrorists as percentage of total terrorists (ITERATE 2004). The 
cyclical nature of the graph represents campaigns of terror over the last 26 years. The most 
recent peak between 2001 and 2004 can be most readily associated with the rise of female 
terrorists in Iraq and other areas. Thus women will be utilized as terrorists if they are available in 
times of war and political uprising. In fact,  since 1985, roughly 34% of terrorist attacks 
perpetrated in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Morocco, Egypt, and 
Iraq were performed by women (Bloom 2005).vii In Israel, between 1985 and 2006, there have 
been more than 220 female suicide bombers, representing nearly 15% of the overall number of 
actual suicide bombers in the world, including those intercepted in the final stages of an attack 
(Schweitzer 2006, 26).viii Between 2002 and 2006, 67 Palestinian women were counted as 
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planning to carry out suicide attacks. Eight of the women blew themselves up. Five of these 
women were affiliated with the Fatah organization, two with Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian 
Territories, and one with Hamas. The other women were arrested at various stages of their 
planned attacks. Of these women, 58% were unmarried, 39% were between the ages of 18-25, 
16% were between the ages of 26-35, and 11% were under 18. Almost half of the women were 
educated; 22% had more than a high school education and only 26% had a high school education 
and were qualified for non-skilled labor. Others were very young women with no high school 
education or profession (Schweitzer 2006, 26).ix These Palestinian women come from a variety 
of backgrounds, thus yielding no coherent profile of the female terrorist in the Palestinian 
Territories. 
 Trying to understand the motivations of women who commit horrific acts of violence is 
difficult given our socially constructed idea of female roles and responsibilities in society. 
Women are viewed as the bearers of life and the moral core of humanity in their roles as 
mothers, sisters, and daughters. This perception is prevalent in the Western world where female 
involvement in crime, and especially terrorism, is viewed through the prism of gender 
stereotypes, which view women as innocent pawns. There is also a tendency to relay this 
perception to women in the Arab/Muslim world, where they are viewed as hidden and 
subservient actors in the state and home. In the case of Islam, Western attitudes tend to limit the 
capacity for thinking outside the realm of preconceived notions rather than accepting other 
perceptions, especially in the case of women in Islam. Thus, if a Palestinian female suicide 
bomber commits an attack on the streets of Jerusalem, Western thinkers will raise questions 
concerning the motivations of this woman and how the use of women as bombers changes the 
fundamentals of previously male dominated terror organizations. Because there is this idea that 
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women are marginal actors in the state and home, Westerners may rush to believe that these 
women were coerced and forced to become suicide bombers, but this is often not the case for the 
women in Palestinian society. This Arab/Muslim understanding of women is essential to the 
study of female Palestinian terrorism. Limiting analyses to predetermined notions of Muslim 
women in traditional roles hampers our capacity to shape explanations for female involvement in 
terrorism. It is essential, therefore, to emphasize that Muslim women are not marginal actors in 
the Arab world, and in fact there has been an increase of female participation in political 
activism related to terrorism. 
In Lebanon, some of the first suicide attacks were conducted by women and were 
organized by the Syrian Socialist National Party. Out of twelve suicide attacks, women were 
involved in five. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) is estimated to have 
10,000 to 18,000 members, of which, according to the Sri Lankan military, half are women. 
Women in the LTTE have been active members since its creation by Vellupillai Prabhakaran. 
Their role in the organization is not marginalized nor is it stigmatized because of their gender. 
They perform almost as many attacks as men and in some cases are preferred because of their 
innocent appearance (i.e. their value as counter-profile agents). Women are trained like men, are 
given weapons, and are taught how to use these arms (Beyler 2003).x Founded in Turkey in 
1987, the Kurdistan Workers Party opted to use suicide terrorism as their modus operandi in 
1995 where women participated in all the group’s activities. These women were trained to 
tolerate the same “Spartan lifestyle” as their male counterparts. In fact, the PKK’s internal 
governing rule was one of violence perpetrated by both genders: the more violent one was the 
higher one’s status. Because this group’s 20,000 members (consisting of both men and women) 
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are under-studied, no reliable data is available to conclusively assess the gender component of 
the PKK (Beyler 2003).xi  
In Chechnya, the notorious Black Widows have been performing terrorist attacks since 
June 7, 2000. Khava Barayeva was the first female suicide bomber for the Black Widows. 
Barayeva, a cousin of a well known Chechen field commander, and Luisa Magomadova drove a 
truck filled with explosives into the temporary headquarters of an elite OMAN (Russian Special 
Forces) detachment in the village of Alkhan Yurt in Chechnya. The attack subsequently resulted 
in two dead and five wounded. Since then, the Black Widows have been responsible for 81% of 
suicide attacks attributed to the Chechen rebel fighters (Akhmedova and Speckhard 2006, 63).xii 
Women have been participants and followers in many terrorist organizations, including the 
National Liberation Front of Algeria, the Chechen Black Widows, Tamil Tigers, Weather 
Underground, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The incidence of women committing 
acts of terror speaks to both the phenomenon of terrorism itself, as well as to our socially 
constructed assumptions about women (Hoogensen 2005, 119).xiii Therefore, the gender 
component is one of the many crucial dimensions in understanding terrorism. One must study 
terrorism from the ground up, assessing the factors of individuals involved in terrorism, rather 
than assessing the factors of just terrorist groups. 
Theories of Palestinian Female involvement in Terror  
After analyzing the opinions that surround Palestinian female involvement in terror, I 
interviewed four Israeli terrorist experts about the instances of Palestinian female suicide 
bombers, asking each what really motivates Palestinian women to become suicide bombers.  The 
opinions of these four experts include the most common and controversial opinions involving the 
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question of gender related suicide terror in the Palestinian Territories. Analyzing the underlying 
motivations of these women will help provide insight into future attacks in hopes that 
policymakers can create appropriate counter-terrorism measures to future attacks. Some of the 
controversial opinions are held by the experts I have interviewed, including Ariel Merari, 
Raphael Israeli, Yoram Schweitzer, and Mira Tzoreff.  
These Israeli experts have studied the phenomenon of terrorism extensively, albeit 
respective to their academic specialties. Ariel Merari is a seasoned psychologist by trade and a 
terrorism expert in practice. A professor in the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv 
University, he has compiled both international and domestic terrorist attacks in a list since 1979, 
which became a computerized database in the early 1980s. The database has grown to include 
thousands of terrorist attacks and several hundred terrorist organizations. The database is 
separated into three main categories; terrorist events, terrorist groups, and public attitudes toward 
terrorism. This database may be one of the most comprehensive terrorism databases in the world, 
and is constantly being updated with each new terror attack. Although retired, Ariel Merari is 
still a highly sought after terrorism expert in Israel and all over the world. The day before we met 
to discuss the subject of Palestinian women in terrorism, a terrorist attack occurred in the city of 
Jerusalem; an Israeli-Arab stole a bulldozer and plowed through the busy streets of Jerusalem, 
attempting to kill Jewish Israelis. Israeli newspaper agencies sought out Merari in order to 
request his opinions only moments after the attack occurred. There is no doubt that Ariel Merari 
is an experienced terrorism expert with a critical outlook that examines the psychological 
motivations of terrorists. However, one of my motivations for meeting with him was to ask him 
why he has never definitively commented on the subject of female participation in terrorism. 
Indeed, his knowledge of terrorism all over the world is vast, but he has never published any 
Grinshpan  
 
11
work concerning Palestinian female suicide bombers. Merari’s main concern was statistical; in 
his opinion, there are too few female terrorists to make statistical analysis reliable.  Merari’s 
knowledge of female participation in suicide terrorism both in Israel and abroad is immense, 
having cited many past attacks perpetrated both in Israel and Iraq by women. However, Merari’s 
primary reasoning for the participation of people in terrorism, regardless of culture or even 
gender, is primarily psychological, having said that:  
Culture and religion in particular seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of 
terrorist suicide. Terrorist suicide, like any other suicide, is basically an individual rather 
than a group phenomenon: it is done by people who wish to die for personal reasons. The 
terrorist framework simply offers the excuse (rather than the real drive) for doing it and 
legitimizes it for being carried out in a violent way. There is no evidence to support the 
notion that influence of a charismatic political or religious leader is in itself sufficient to 
drive an otherwise non-suicidal person to wish to commit terrorist suicide. However, such 
influence may conceivably serve as an ancillary factor, boosting an already existing 
suicidal tendency and channeling it to a certain modus operandi, time, and place. (Merari 
1993, 206-207)xiv  
Merari’s explanations are based on the psychological influences that affect the everyday lives of 
people before they decide to commit an act of suicide terrorism. Yet does his assessment of the 
individual necessarily apply in the case of women terrorists? There are different motivating 
factors for men and women. Palestinian women play no central role in terrorist organizations like 
Fatah, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad. Women are not indoctrinated into these groups like men; rather 
their status in society is prized for being responsible for producing and caring for children. 
Women are not subjected to the same propaganda that men are subjected to in Palestinian 
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society. While it is plausible to say that Palestinian men who have committed suicide attacks 
must have harbored a tendency toward suicide and that a charismatic leader pushed these men to 
the point of no return, can the same be said for women of the same society when they are not 
subject to the same influences? The monetary rewards for women are even lower than that of 
men, and instead of receiving 72 black-eyed Suras in heaven, women are promised to be reunited 
with their husband. Indeed, there is no fundamental difference between the earthly and heavenly 
rewards for women. Women are involved in women’s groups that may be political in nature, but 
under no circumstance does their society compel them to take up an armed resistance against 
Israelis. Instead, terrorist organizations wish them to indoctrinate their sons to become political 
militants against Israel. Thus the research of Ariel Merari, although compelling, is missing a vital 
gender component. There are factors that push men to commit attacks in violent way but what 
are the aggravating factors that push women?  
A psychological component certainly exists in the motivations of Palestinian female 
suicide bombers, but Raphael Israeli believes that the psychological explanation for female 
participation is exaggerated. Israeli, an expert on Islamic terrorism, has written on the 
motivations of both men and women respective to gender. Israeli believes that a suicide attacker 
is not subject to the same suicidal resolve that Western psychiatry tries to impose. On the 
contrary, Israeli believes that terrorists are a part of a larger scheme for which they are prepared 
and trained, together with others who share their convictions, and are equipped by arduous 
physical and mental training. Along with this explanation, Israeli draws upon the similarities 
between the Japanese kamikaze and the Islamic martyr, “Muslim fundamentalist self-immolating 
assassins- who have nothing suicidal about them, come closest to kamikazes in organization, 
ideology, execution of their attack, posthumous glory, and historical background of self-effacing 
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loyalty, and culture of shame.” (Israeli 2003, 78)xv Thus Israeli adopted the appellation- 
Islamikaze, to describe these terrorists. He applies the same label to women who involve 
themselves in Islamic martyrdom in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli contends that female 
participation starts with a Muslim interpretation of honor, and indeed this idea of honor in 
Muslim society is compelling and deserves examination. Israeli states that the answer to female 
involvement lies in the Islamic definition of honor: 
Arabic distinguishes between male (sharaf) and female honor (‘ird). As in the West, 
man’s honor is related to the deeds he performs and image he projects. His honor is 
redeemable if he only applies himself to maintain it, shelter it and retrieve it when lost. 
The woman’s honor, by contrast, refers to her intimacy, modesty and decency in dress, 
the preservation of virginity until marriage, gentle behavior and seclusion from male 
society, which is corrupt by definition. If she should fail in one of those categories, her 
honor is forever lost (Israeli 2004, 66).xvi  
The man is thus deemed the protector of a woman’s honor which, if ruined, dishonors her 
as well as the family. Israeli contends that the lack of parity between the honor of a man and that 
of a woman leaves men in a dominant role, which women are in a constant struggle to abolish. 
Israeli primarily believes that Muslim women in the Palestinian Territories are arming 
themselves as suicide bombers in order to emancipate themselves from the disparity of honor and 
citizenship within the community. In his work, Israeli asserts that these women listen to the 
proclamations of religious sheikhs which call women to become suicide bombers. For instance, 
Sheikh Yassin, the former infamous religious leader of Hamas, decreed a fatwa that rescinded 
the usage of a chaperone when a woman leaves her home if she was a going to become a martyr. 
Another religious leader, Sheikh Abu al-Hassan, decreed that the act of Jihad by women against 
Grinshpan  
 
14
the Jews was permissible. Israeli describes that in response to these fatwas and the rejection of 
marginal roles in Palestinian society, Palestinian women become suicide bombers in order to 
gain equal citizenship and eventually emancipate their fellow woman. Israeli even cites the 
activism of women like Hanan Ashwari, who attained rank in the cabinet of the Palestinian 
Authority but is most famous for helping lead the first intifada, and Leila Khaled, who was one 
of the first female terrorists, having hijacked two airplanes in the late 1970s in order to draw 
attention to the Palestinian people as two of these female emancipators (Israeli 2004, 66).xvii 
During our conversations, Raphael Israeli and I discussed the role of these women in Islam. He 
was absolutely certain that these women were not only emancipating themselves by becoming 
suicide bombers, but were doing so intentionally. I told him the stories of some of these bombers 
who have been dishonored in their community and were even subject to honor killings if they did 
not redeem themselves by committing suicide attacks, but he remained certain that these women 
are actually Western-style feminists.  
 This approach to analyzing female participation in terrorism could be true in other parts 
of the world where women prize more Western ideas of freedom, but this is not likely to be true 
in the Palestinian Territories. Israeli references women like Leila Khaled and Hanan Ashwari as 
women that have taken substantial strides for feminism in the Muslim world and that their 
endeavors are feminist. The actions of Ahwari were not violent in nature, and Khaled was a 
terrorist and a Palestinian patriot with no intentions of suicide or murder. Leila Khaled was a 
Marxist and, along with her compatriots, hijacked a TWA flight heading for Tel-Aviv. Khaled 
did not intend to commit suicide and blow the plane up nor were her intentions to hurt any 
passengers, but rather to redirect the plane to an Arab country where it would be blown up to 
cause a media sensation. She was later involved in more hijackings, which led to her capture. 
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Khaled did inflict terror on the passengers that she hijacked, but she never intended to kill. 
Indeed, Khaled was a terrorist, activist, and maybe a feminist, but she is not categorized as 
having the same motivations as Palestinian female suicide bombers like Wafa Idris, who was the 
first Palestinian woman to commit murder and suicide in Israel. Wafa’s status in the community 
was a contributing factor for her involvement in a suicide bombing, but her intentions were 
neither feminist nor Western. She did not seek to emancipate women. Like many after her, Wafa 
was a matriarchal conservative, subject to her own society’s definition of women’s roles and 
honor. As we will see, in the case of the Palestinian female suicide bombers, these women are 
committing suicide terrorism as an act of personal and familial redemption. 
 Although insights into the motivations of women lay important groundwork for counter-
terrorism strategy, Yoram Schweitzer studies the strategies and tactics of terrorist organizations 
by interviewing both male and female members. Yoram Schweitzer works for the Israeli Policy 
Institute for Strategic Studies, where he combines academic studies with field work. The institute 
provides academic work that contributes to Israel’s counter-terrorism policies. Yoram 
Schweitzer’s field work includes interviews with several failed terrorists, both male and female, 
and their families. During my meeting with him, Schweitzer provided little insight into the 
motivations of the female terrorists although he completely agreed that these women are not 
feminists. Instead, he focuses on the groups that employ women. According to Schweitzer, 
Palestinian and Islamic terrorist groups do not seek or recruit women for terrorist attacks, but if a 
woman seeks out a group or a member of a terrorist organization, a woman will be employed. 
These women are not sought after to commit attacks, but when the women seek out members of 
terrorist organizations they are always used as Shahidas (female martyrs) for a tactical 
advantage. In the Muslim world it is taboo for a woman to seek out a man that is unrelated to her, 
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so when women seek out male members of terrorist organizations they are essentially locked in 
to committing the attack for fear of being reprimanded by the community for mixing with a non-
related man. This implies that if a woman were to put her honor in question by seeking out a 
man, she may have previously compromised her honor. Not only do women have to be willing to 
commit these attacks when they seek out terrorist male counterparts to help them, they also have 
to have a reason to put their honor in jeopardy. In the case of Palestinian female suicide bombers, 
a woman’s honor must have been irreversibly damaged in order for her to put her honor in 
danger of being destroyed.  
 Yoram Schweitzer maintained that female terrorists in the Palestinian Territories are not 
an intended strategic plan of terrorist organizations, but are merely being employed for tactical 
reasons. Thus men from these groups do not seek out women nor do they allow their active 
membership in these groups. In essence, the implementation of women for terror attacks poses a 
fundamental religious obstacle for religious leaders, but women’s important tactical advantage 
overcomes these reservations. At Israeli checkpoints, where Israeli soldiers often rely on racial 
profiles to identify possible terrorists (including indicators like nervous body language and 
identification cards), Muslim women are seldom perceived to pose a violent threat toward Israeli 
targets. In Israel, only recently has the situation shifted to one where women are employed by 
terror groups and therefore pose a more substantial threat to Israeli civilians. There is a hesitancy 
to search women because of their modesty and the stereotypical view of women as non-violent.  
The dominant Western mentality of Israeli soldiers blinded them to the possibility of female 
attackers and subsequently suffered for this with the death of many Israelis. The Israeli Defense 
Forces are renowned for their women warriors, but Israel’s perception of Muslim culture did not 
factor in the use of Muslim women as human bombs. In response to this, female soldiers are now 
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posted at checkpoints for the sole purpose of searching suspicious Palestinian women. Tactically 
speaking, female suicide bombers have a substantial advantage in infiltrating checkpoints. 
Women provide low cost, low risk weapons for an organization’s cause. In terrorist 
organizations men are trained and indoctrinated. Their training is an investment of money, effort, 
and resources; they are then used as leaders, soldiers, planners, and bomb makers (essentially a 
myriad of positions that make up any militant organization). On the other hand, desperate women 
have a distinct advantage as suicide bombers. Women are not given months of training, 
investment of weapons, or even trust. They are given minimal information about their operation, 
hence women are cost-effective and terrorists will often ensure success of their mission by 
equipping the women not only with suicide vests, but also a separate detonator in the hands of 
another member should she change her mind. Thus the advantage of using female bombers is 
undeniable. The use of women also creates a media sensation by the publication of their 
background stories and the brutality of the group that uses women. Indeed, female terrorists 
create a media stir in Israel and all over the world. When a woman blows herself up in Israel or 
Iraq, the media highlights the brutality of the event, acting as a monolithic advertisement for the 
organization that employs female terrorists. When I asked Yoram Schweitzer if he had any 
insight into the use of women in Iraq, considering there is very little academic work on the 
subject, he only alluded to the fact that these women serve as a tactical advantage to terror 
organizations. Yoram Schweitzer also did not agree with Raphael Israeli’s assessment that these 
women are blowing themselves up for feminist goals.  
Matriarchal Conservatism – An Alternative Theory  
The study of Palestinian female suicide terrorists revolve around their role in Islam. By 
Western standards, “[Women] are depicted as existing on the margins of society, victimized to 
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such as extent that it defies credibility that such individuals could continue to wage the heroic 
daily battle that many Arab Women in real life undertake to survive” (Sabbagh 1996, xiii).xviii 
These perceptions of female roles in Islam are slanted and untrue; mostly women, especially 
matriarchal conservatives, do not feel marginalized by their religion. Contrary to this, these 
women feel powerful and appreciate their status in the community as faithful, righteous 
Muslims.  Matriarchal conservatives define their role in society from the Prophet Muhammad’s 
relationship with women. The lives and marriages of two of Muhammad’s wives, Khadija and 
Aisha, encapsulate the kinds of changes and roles that have overtaken women in Islamic Arabia. 
Khadija, Muhammad’s first wife, employed him to oversee her business. Khadija actually 
proposed to Muhammad, having been married before, when she was forty and he was twenty-
five. Khadija has a central role in the story of Islam because of her importance to Muhammad. 
Because of her wealth, Khadija’s money freed Muhammad from the need to earn a living and 
enabled him to lead the life of contemplation that was the prelude to his becoming a prophet. 
Khadija’s support and confidence in her husband allowed him to venture out and preach Islam. 
Since Khadija was married to Muhammad before he received his first revelation, the custom of 
her economic independence, her marriage overture (apparently without a male guardian to act as 
intermediary) and her marriage to a man several years her junior all reflect Jahilia, or pre-Islamic 
period, rather than Islamic practice (Ahmed 1992, 41).xix  
 The control of women by male guardians and several other customs that are fixtures of 
Islamic marriage today are attributed to Muhammad’s marriage to Aisha, the Prophet’s favorite 
wife, and the subsequent wives that followed. Aisha’s position in her marriage to the Prophet 
was a precursor to the limitations that typify the lives of modern Muslim women. Aisha was born 
to Muslim parents and married Muhammad when she was nine or ten.  Soon thereafter, along 
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with her co-wives, Aisha began to observe the new customs of veiling and seclusion. 
Muhammad was said to employ the veil for his wives because they were often harassed on the 
streets with questions for the Prophet. Consequently, Muhammad utilized the veil to protect their 
identities from the community, leaving Aisha, the favorite and most sought-after wife, 
indistinguishable from his other wives.  Thus it is important to note that the use of the veil was 
not for abusive or manipulative purposes, but rather was imposed only on the wives of 
Muhammad for protective purposes, more specifically to protect the identity of Aisha (Ahmed 
1992, 42). xx
 Throughout Muhammad’s lifetime veiling, like seclusion, was observed only by his 
wives. Moreover, the phrase “she took the veil” is used in the Hadith to mean that a woman 
became a wife of Muhammad. Even after Muhammad’s death, when the material incorporated 
into the Hadith was circulated, veiling and seclusion were still specific to Muhammad’s wives. 
However, during the reign of Umar (634-644) the role of women changed forever. Umar was 
known to brutalize women in both private and public life; he was ill-tempered with women and 
often physically abused his wives. Umar confined women to their homes and prevented their 
participation in prayers at the mosque, and even went as far as to appoint different imams for 
each sex (Ahmed 1992).  xxi Umar’s integration of different Islamic customs along with the 
subsequent religious leaders helped define the role of women in different parts of Arabia. 
Presently in most Islamist debates, women are not understood to be the passive recipients of a 
newly defined identity, but active participants in the new culture and society that the Islamists 
are intent on bringing into being from past conceptions of women’s roles (Yazbeck 1996, 
137).xxii Islamists have appropriated various norms and values from their heritage for which they 
have found precedent and justification in Islamic teaching; this assures their pupils that new 
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values that are propagated are grounded in the idea of true Islam (Yazbeck 1996, 139). xxiii 
Islamic women today generally embrace their roles as righteous Muslims and construct their own 
identity in terms of historical precedent in their culture as opposed to Western advances in 
women’s socio-political movement. Muhammad’s death sparked a series of rebellions in 
different parts of Arabia, in which Muhammad’s wife, Aisha, took brief political control of 
Arabia. Modern Muslim feminists have collected many names of the women who fought during 
the time of the Prophet. One of these feminist scholars, Aliyyya Mustafa Mubarak, assembled a 
list of 67 women who, according to her, fought in the wars of the Prophet Muhammad or in other 
immediate Islamic conquests. The list is comprised of women who took part in both support and 
lead roles in the ensuing rebellions (Cook 2005, 375).xxiv
Cases of female participation in war and as companions of the Prophet Muhammad  are 
also found in both classical and modern accounts, such as in the works of the moralist, Abd al-
Ghani b. Abd al-Wahid al Maqdisi (d. 1203) in his treatise Manaqib al-sahabiyyat (The Merits of 
the Women Companions [of the Prophet Muhammad]). The moralist describes two women from 
the time of the Prophet who fought in his wars. Nusayba was the daughter of the Ka’b (also 
known as Um Umara), and is said to have helped wounded fighters during the Battle of Uhud, 
subsequently sustaining 12 wounds after drawing a sword in the face of defeat. Another woman 
cited by al-Maqdsi was Safiya, the aunt of the Muhammad. Safiya is said to have fought in the 
battle of Khandaq where she took refuge in one of the strongholds of Medina, together with men 
and women. A group of Jews settled below the stronghold, and when one of them climbed the 
wall in order to penetrate the fort, Safiya cut off his head and threw it back to the people outside. 
Clearly, women took a role in fighting but one woman in practice set the precedent for 
martyrdom in Islam. Indeed, the first martyr in Islam was a woman (Cook 2005).xxv Such is 
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stated here on the subject of jihad in al-Bukhari’s collection of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
traditions: 
The Messenger of God would enter into the house of Umm Haram daughter of Milhan, 
and she would feed him (Umm Haram was married to ‘Ubada b. al-Samit’). So the 
Messenger of God went onto her, and she fed him and began to pick the lice off his head. 
The Messenger of God fell asleep and then woke up, laughing. She said: Why are you 
laughing? He said: People from my community [Muslims] were shown to me fighting in 
the path of God, sailing in the midst of the sea like kings on thrones. She said: O 
Messenger of God, pray to God that I might be one of them! And so the Messenger of 
God prayed for her…and she sailed the seas during the time of Mu’awiya b. Abi Sufyan 
[661-80], and fell from her mount when she disembarked and perished (al-Bukhari 
1991).xxvi
This passage accounts for the first act of martyrdom by a woman. In accordance with the 
usual modern interpretation of jihad, women are not allowed to participate, but the presence of 
this passage sets the precedent for female participation in Islamic martyrdom (Cook 2005).xxvii 
The presence of women in war is not unprecedented in Muslim history. Clearly, women did take 
part in fighting for the Prophet Muhammad, but the importance of their role and whether they 
were in lead or supporting positions is still under debate. In fact, the entire use of women in 
terrorism is under debate in the Arab world and especially in the Palestinian Territories. When 
men or women from the Palestinian Territories commit terror attacks in Israel, the attacks as well 
as the family members of the attackers are well publicized. Families of martyrs are often willing 
and eager to tell the story of their child or family member who has honored themselves by 
becoming a martyr for the Prophet Muhammad or for a national cause.  Copious amounts of 
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information are available that divulge the background information of Palestinian female terrorists 
conducive for the study and analysis. Barbara Victor, a well known international journalist, and 
Yoram Schweitzer, an Israeli terrorism expert, have traveled to the Palestinian Territories and 
Jordan where they interviewed the families of several female terrorists and some failed terrorists, 
thereby giving us an important glimpse into the lives and relationships of these women and their 
participation in suicide terror. 
The motivations of Palestinian female suicide bombers relate to a type of Arab feminism 
I term matriarchal conservatism, which is prevalent in the Palestinian Territories and similar 
areas like Iraq. By matriarchal conservatism I refer to an Arab/Muslim woman’s own idea of 
femininity, not in Western terms, but in Arab/Muslim ones. While Western feminists advocate 
gender equality in the division of labor, politics, and society, some Islamists believe that by 
presenting themselves publicly in a virtuous way, they sustain their role in society’s traditional 
structures (Fadwa 159, 1996).xxviii Matriarchal conservatism in Islamic discourse does not 
portray women as diminutive and second-class members of a family unit, but rather as central 
figures charged with the exceedingly important task of educating their children, especially their 
sons. Hence, matriarchal conservatism would deem Islamic values (rather than Western ones the 
ultimate liberator. “Thus Islamist discourse refuses to identify the affirmation of the equality of 
men with women and of newly defined roles for women as having anything to do with liberation, 
as that term is defined in the West. Islam is seen as providing all of the rights and responsibilities 
appropriate for women. Islam is thus itself the liberating force that can be set in motion through 
the devoted adherence or both males and females” (Haddad and Smith 1996, 148).xxix In keeping 
with matriarchal conservatism, these women will maintain their modesty and virtue for the sake 
of their honor and that of their families. The responsibility to sustain modesty, honor, and virtue 
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is the central responsibility for matriarchs, and thus these women will suffer the consequences if 
their honor is questioned, and will struggle to redeem it when lost.  Such consequences may lead 
women to redeem honor for their families and themselves by perpetrating the most virtuous act, 
martyrdom. In doing so, I have developed one neglected explanation for the phenomenon of 
female suicide bombers, which I term matriarchal conservatism.  In a nutshell, I contend that 
Islamic female suicide bombers are using a very unconventional method (female terrorism) to 
achieve a very conventional (or traditional) goal – the maintenance or restoration of female honor 
as it is defined by their communities.   
 
Matriarchal conservatism does not relate to the Western conception of independent and 
socially equal women, but rather refers to the idea that Muslim women, in response to their 
culture, seek honor and status in a community that prizes righteousness, modesty, motherhood, 
and service to the Prophet Mohammad and the males in their lives. Indeed, the basic discourse in 
Islam is the rejection of the West and the conviction that “freedoms” enjoyed by Western women 
are among the key factors in the moral and ethical disintegration of Western societies. “Western 
sisters” are even depicted as outside of Islamic culture, traitorous for bringing shame upon their 
families and communities (Hadadd and Smith 1996, 138-139). xxx Matriarchs believe that these 
freedoms enjoyed by Western women do not liberate them, but instead subject them to the 
chauvinism of males in Western society (Haddad and Smith 1996). xxxi In the eyes of traditional 
Muslim women, their lives are not oppressive or miserable, and although Western perspectives 
may lead to the idea that these women are trying to rebel or change their way of life, Muslim 
women who become suicide bombers are probably not doing so to change the status quo for 
other women. Today political Islam has placed the issue of the roles and rights of women at the 
Grinshpan  
 
24
center of its agenda. The rhetoric of Islamist teaching, speaking, and writing makes it clear that 
the ways in which women act, dress, and behave themselves are crucial in the reconstruction of a 
new and authentically Islamic society (Fadwa 1996, 159).xxxii  However, there are some women 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are trying to change the way of life for women in their 
community to fit a more Western construction of femininity. Women’s committees were founded 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and are considered the foundation of the Palestinian women’s 
movement. The Women’s Work Committee was among the first Palestinian feminist 
organizations in which the women of WWC produced material and design projects that are now 
relevant to the daily experiences and struggles of women outside urban centers. Indeed, groups 
like the WWC and other groups affiliated with them [i.e. the Unified National Leadership of the 
Uprising (UNLU) which was organized in response to the first intifada, Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committee 
(UPWWC)] have been created to propel female initiatives in the Palestinian Territories, and yet 
none have committed much less involved themselves in terrorist attacks (Sharoni 1995, 65).xxxiii 
These groups are closer to examples of Western feminism and yet none of these organizations 
use terrorists or suicide bombers to promote their agenda. 
The feminist movement in the Palestinian Territories is has no relationship to matriarchal 
conservatism. Such is also the opinion of Mira Tzoreff, a professor at Tel-Aviv University and 
expert in the social structure of Egyptian culture. While discussing female suicide bombers, 
Tzoreff contends that these women are committing suicide before they are committing acts of 
murder or violence. The female suicide bombers have been driven to suicide terror in order to 
reinstate their honor and the honor of their family in the community. For matriarchal 
conservatives, honor is the most important virtue of women. In one of the intifada leadership 
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flyers, Palestinian mothers, sisters, and daughters are described as Palestinian manabit – plant 
nurseries – or as men producing factories. xxxiv Their more honored purpose is to produce sons, 
but if their honor is destroyed or even in question, their status in the community is effectively 
ruined. Indeed, gossip (Kalaam Alnaas) سﺎﻨﻟا مﻼﻗ or “what people say”- can ruin the status of a 
woman in the Palestinian community without actually being guilty of any offense. Barbara 
Victor, a journalist who has interviewed Palestinian suicide bombers, believes that “Given the 
importance ascribed to honor within Palestinian society, it is no surprise that such a woman 
might consider it an honor to die for the sake of her family” (Victor 2003, 199).xxxv In these 
Palestinian societies it is impossible to escape and leave your family and friends, because if you 
do, you are a disgrace, and the disgrace on your family is even greater (Victor 2003).xxxvi The 
unmarried Palestinian woman today lives under a stringent set of social and religious rules; if she 
is too educated she is considered abnormal, if she looks at a man to whom she is not related she 
risks exclusion, if she refuses to marry she is deemed out of control, if she sleeps with a man or 
gets pregnant, she disgraces her family and risks death at the hands of her male relatives (Victor 
2003).xxxvii What follows are the stories of matriarchal conservatives who, subject to the demand 
of their own culture, have committed suicide and murder in an attempt to restore the honor of 
their families.  
While accounting for the motivations of female suicide bombers, not one theorist thought 
that women perform suicide attacks due to foreign occupation. It begs the question; would the 
women in the Palestinian Territories or Iraq perform attacks if there was no occupation? The 
female suicide bombers of Israel and Iraq, I argue, are matriarchal conservatives. They have been 
shunned by their society for an often trivial oversight or opprobrious act. Women will therefore 
use foreign occupation as an opportunity to redeem their status, if no foreign aggressor is present 
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for women to assail, women may perform attacks on different enemies. The female suicide 
bombers have been responsible for attacking both Shiite and Sunni communities in Iraq as well 
as American forces. In conclusion, Palestinian women could use the Israeli occupation as an 
excuse to redeem honor. 
Case Studies as Explicators 
The sundry cases of Palestinian female suicide bombers that I have collected are 
examples of matriarchal conservatives. These cases serve as evidence that matriarchal 
conservatism does exist in Palestine, however it does not contend that all instances of female 
terrorism are due to matriarchal conservative values. While a much larger number of cases 
should be collected in order to assert matriarchal conservative proneness to suicide terrorism, 
these samples serve to prove that if given the opportunity to redeem their honor, matriarchal 
conservative women may utilize suicide bombings as a tool for redemption. Therefore, the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territories serve as the opportunity rather than the reason for 
matriarchal conservatives to redeem their honor.  The first female suicide bomber for Palestine 
was not a political activist, a feminist, nor was she a militant within Tanzim (the military of 
Fatah). She was a young woman who would live in infamy for being the first female suicide 
attacker. She became so famous that Sadaam Hussein was said to have erected a statue of her 
figure so all young women would follow her example. Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, the charismatic 
spokesman for Hamas, even offered future female martyrs a lifetime stipend of two hundred 
dollars a month to the families even though four hundred dollars would go to the families of 
males martyrs (Victor 2003).xxxviii On the afternoon of January 27, 2002, Wafa Idris, a twenty-six 
year old Palestinian woman, blew herself up in a downtown Jerusalem shopping mall, killing one 
Israeli man and wounding 131 bystanders (Victor 2003).xxxix Wafa Idris was not involved in any 
Grinshpan  
 
27
political organization nor was she known for being a Muslim extremist. On the contrary, Wafa 
grew up in a small house with her family and married her first cousin, Ahmad, at the age of 
sixteen. For any Muslim woman in a small Palestinian village, the most significant and basic role 
of the woman is childbearing, but in 1998 Wafa gave birth to a stillborn female infant. The entire 
family was devastated and her husband was humiliated. For Wafa, it was a love story, she was 
attracted to Ahmad for many years prior, but due to social pressure from his immediate family 
her husband was forced to divorce her because of her inability to fulfill her wifely duties. In fact, 
Ahmad later said that “at first my family blamed Wafa, and then they blamed me.” Apparently 
the family accused him of being unable to create an infant that would survive in Wafa’s womb 
(Victor 2003, 42).xl  After the trauma of the stillbirth, a local doctor told Wafa and her husband, 
in the presence of their families, that she would never be able to carry a child to full term, 
effectively ruining her status and reputation in the community. Soon thereafter, Wafa Idris fell 
into a spiraling depression that effectively led her to abandon her duties to her husband. 
Mira Tzoreff explains that throughout the Palestinian Territories and the Arab world, a 
woman is dependent legally and socially. In every aspect of her life, a man, either brother, father, 
or husband makes all the decisions.  In doing so, Ahmad sought out an Imam in order to handle 
the situation at home. Ahmad’s Imam explained that answers to female disobedience could be 
found in the Koran, and that if she did not listen to her husband, by either getting out of bed, or 
having children, he could seek a new wife. Wafa’s husband did seek out a new wife, and in 
doing so, he disgraced Wafa in the community and humiliated her by sending her back to her 
immediate family, making her a financial burden on the family and effectively making her 
undesirable for wedlock because barren women are cast out as useless.  After moving back in 
with her family, Wafa Idris found employment with the Red Crescent Moon in order to regain 
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purpose in her life. However, she was still rejected by the community. Wafa sought out the help 
of Fatah members in order to regain her status in the community and possibly escape an honor 
killing from the hands of a male family member. Wafa may have been coerced by her culture to 
perform a terror attack that would bring honor back to her family, send her to heaven, and 
reinstate her status as a virtuous woman. After Wafa’s suicide attack in the streets of Jerusalem, a 
council member of Fatah eulogized, “Wafa’s martyrdom restored her honor to the national role 
of the Palestinian woman, sketched the most wonderful pictures of heroism in the long battle for 
national liberation” (Victor 54). Indeed, her family’s status was regained, their financial 
burdened relieved, and the beginning of a dangerous trend of female terrorists was born (Victor 
2003).xli
Wafa Idris is an example to young Palestinian women that honor can be won in exchange 
for life. Several women followed in the footsteps of Wafa, including a young Palestinian woman 
named Zina (the pseudonym of Zina is used at the request of her family).  Zina was born to a 
middle-class Palestinian family of 12 children. Zina had a rebellious spirit and, according to her 
family, had a history of problems both at school and at home. Zina refused to wear the jilbab and 
the hijab, the traditional covering for face and body, and had aspirations of leaving Jordan to 
become an international journalist far from home. At the university in Amman, Zina studied 
English until she became proficient, and eventually got a job at an American television network, 
where she trained as an intern. Zina’s life took an unfortunate turn when she refused to marry a 
man her parents had chosen. Zina was absolutely against an arranged marriage, especially 
because she was in love with someone else. Zina had a secret relationship for several months 
until one of her brothers discovered her relationship after following her to class. After a family 
discussion, it was decided that Zina could no longer be trusted to go anywhere on her own. Her 
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father refused to allow her to continue her studies and instructed his wife to keep their daughter 
locked in her room until he consulted with the Imam about her future. Unfortunately, Zina later 
discovered she was pregnant. Terrified that her father and brother would kill her if they found 
out, she decided to keep her condition a secret for as long as possible before a planned escape to 
Egypt with the father of her baby. It took several months for her condition to show and when it 
did she was savagely beaten into revealing the father. Zina’s boyfriend was so scared for his life 
that he escaped to Cairo. Zina was allowed to have the child but she would have to remain in her 
father’s home and give it up to one of her married family members. Zina considered herself 
lucky because most women in her condition would have been subject to an honor killing, 
considering there was no way to find the father of the child (Victor 2003).xlii  
Zina’s life was unbearable, and because she had a cousin in Tanzim, she was approached 
in May 2001 and told that the only way to redeem herself and her family was to leave Amman 
for Ramallah, on the condition that she prepares herself for an eventual military mission that 
would take her life in the name of liberating Palestine. Only after she completed the mission 
would she be exonerated from her sins, and if she were still alive, allowed to live a life free from 
admonishment. Zina went through trainings and was prepared for several missions… but, in the 
process, fell in love with her handler, Hassan, the man responsible for her recruitment and 
terrorist activities. During their affair, Zina was supposed to carry out an attack and only 
afterward would Hassan decide to marry her. On July 25, 2002, Zina was given her first real 
mission. She was to carry a bomb, concealed in a beer can, across the checkpoint from Ramallah 
to Jerusalem. However, the bomb was not powerful enough to kill anybody and Zina made her 
escape from Jerusalem. According to Zina, she barely saw Hassan the following days after the 
attack, eventually discovering that Hassan had a wife and three children in Nablus. This did not 
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deter Zina’s participation in terrorist activities. On August 9, 2001 she was responsible for 
transporting the infamous suicide bomber to the Sbarro Pizza Restaurant, which took the lives of 
15 people and injured more than 130. Weeks later, she was caught and sentenced to twenty-five 
years in prison for her part in the Sbarro’s bombing, convicted as an accomplice in the deaths 
and injuries of all the victims. Zina’s support role for Tanzim never exonerated her sins in the 
community; she was caught for terrorist activities before she was able to regain her status by 
becoming a Palestinian suicide bomber (Victor 2003).xliii   
Although Zina was considered a rebellious fixture in her community, not all Palestinian 
female terrorists were considered tainted or insubordinate because of personal choices. Such is 
the case of Darine Abu Aisha, an obedient daughter and another academic achiever. In December 
2001, she entered a literary contest, in which Darine quotes from the Koran:  
All men and women are equal, individuals should not be judged according to gender, 
beauty, wealth, or privilege. The only thing that makes one person better than another is 
his or her character. I am a Muslim woman who believes her body belongs to her alone, 
which means that how I look should not play a role in who I am or what response I evoke 
from people who meet me. Wearing the hijab gives me freedom, because my physical 
appearance is not an issue (Victor 2003, 106).xliv   
Darine was the youngest of seven children and was twenty years old when she died. She 
was an intelligent student at Al-Najah University in Nablus. Samira, a cousin of hers, claims that 
there were many suitors who came to ask for Darine’s hand in marriage because she was 
considered very beautiful.  Darine was believed to be a leader, someone who was not easily 
influenced by others and who stood up for what she believed in regardless of what her peers 
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thought. Although her family was pleased with her academic achievements at the university, she 
was still unmarried and had no intention of marrying in the future. Darine knew that as a 
Palestinian woman her fate was sealed, an arranged marriage with six or seven children, and a 
husband who probably would not have the same intellectual curiosity as she did. What pushed 
Darine over the edge is subject to debate, but according to Nabila (Darine’s mother) Darine was 
severely dishonored while standing in line at a checkpoint to get into Israel. As a mischievous 
joke, a soldier forced a male companion of Darine, Rashid, to kiss her in return for allowing 
them and a screaming baby through the checkpoint. At first Darine refused but later consented on 
behalf of the sick child waiting to get across the line. Before Darine could act, the soldier ripped 
the hijab off Darine’s head. Nabila knew that the chances of her daughter getting married were 
hurt, she thus arranged with the family of Rashid to marry Darine. Darine was horrified with this 
idea, but Rashid promised Darine to help her find another solution so that her family would not 
be disgraced. Darine then decided to become a Palestinian suicide bomber. Darine detonated 
herself at the Maccabim checkpoint near Jerusalem, thereby injuring several Israeli soldiers. 
Once again, a Palestinian woman committed an act of suicide terror in order to regain her status 
(Victor 2003).xlv
Although many of the women who became terrorists were subjected to the social 
humiliation and taboos of their society for being dishonored, the situation of Ayat Al-Akras 
seemed to have been different. Ayat grew up in Dehaishe camp near Bethlehem with her parents 
Khadra and Mohammed. Ayat’s father worked as a supervisor with an Israeli construction firm 
in the settlement of Betar Ilit. The story of the family is filled with tragedies. Samir, the oldest 
child, was jailed twice for throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. Another son, Fathi, was injured by 
Israeli bullets and one daughter suffered a miscarriage. The status of the family was damaged 
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within the community, especially since Mohammad worked for an Israeli company that 
expanded home sites within the territories. Ayat had a lot of success in school and at the age of 
15 became engaged to Shadi Abu Laban, her first cousin and her first choice for marriage. Ayat’s 
ambition was to work as a correspondent for an Arab newspaper in the West Bank. However, 
according to Shadi, Ayat was always embarrassed and ashamed that her father worked for an 
Israeli company, believing that working for the Jews was wrong.  Eventually, whispers and 
gossip began in the Dehaishe refugee camp and in a community where status and honor are 
worth one’s life. The gossip referred to Mohammad’s relationship with the Israelis and escalated 
into a story about a man who was a traitor, a collaborator who had sold out his people in return 
for a comfortable life. Ayat may have believed that the only way to salvage the reputation of her 
family and avoid death at the hands of an angry mob was to commit to a martyrs’ death. On 
Friday, March 29, 2002, only months before her wedding, Ayat detonated herself at a Jerusalem 
supermarket. Ayat seemed to have everything going for her, why would she commit suicide and 
murder? There is no evidence of coercion or personal disgrace or perhaps we do not know the 
entire story considering that her family is the only source regarding her intentions (Victor 
2003).xlvi In the documentary, To Die in Jerusalem, the producers juxtapose the lives of the 
attacker, Ayat Akras, and one of her victims, Rachel Levy. Interviews with Ayat’s parents 
resemble more nationalist propaganda than conversations with bereaved parents, and do not 
mention Mr. Akras’s work with the Israeli government, but do show him polishing the new Audi 
he purchased (most likely after the death of his daughter). Indeed, cash awards are routinely paid 
to the families of martyrs.  
Although useful information can be gleaned from interviews with those closest to suicide 
attackers, interviews with women caught in the act of terror have been conducted in order to 
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reveal motivations. Shireen Rabiya was a tall, slim, beautiful girl living in the Palestinian 
territories. In any other culture, Shireen would have been considered model material, but Shireen 
lived in a society where she was teased for being too beautiful and therefore harassed by 
suspicious gossip. Subsequently, she left high school because of the harassment. Shireen’s uncle 
recruited her for a terrorist operation because of this gossip and because she was the only one in 
her family without a husband. Shireen never succeeded in her attack and was subsequently 
placed in prison. Shireen was sought out because she was considered an outcast in her society, 
not as a result of sexual promiscuity or betrayal, but simply because she was thought to be 
beautiful and lonely (Victor 2003). xlvii
Yoram Schweitzer has also performed interviews with failed suicide terrorists, which is 
possibly the most compelling way to extract the true motivations of Palestinian female terrorists.  
Thouria Khamour was born in 1976 and lived in Jba in the Jenin area. She was arrested on May 
19, 2002, one day before she planned on carrying out a suicide attack in Jerusalem. She was 
arrested at home, before embarking on the mission she had volunteered for two weeks 
previously. Yoram Schweitzer interviewed her several times, and in these interviews she gave 
several different versions of her motivations and the ways she was recruited for her mission. As 
time went on, and as Thouria became more indoctrinated into the prison system’s culture of 
Islamic extremism and political activism, she recast herself from a girl with personal motives to a 
Palestinian and Islamic nationalist struggling against the Zionist entity. However, during the first 
interview, Thouria claimed she volunteered for the terror attack because she was subject to great 
personal pressure and mental distress, and according to Schweitzer, this is the most valid 
reasoning she gave behind her attacks. Thouria said her family rejected the man she wanted to 
marry and this caused her great pain. Thouria claims that when she was seventeen she was 
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rebuked by her family for tomboyish way of dressing and was warned that she would not find a 
husband. Thouria was a mediocre student and only stayed in school until tenth grade. She 
changed jobs several times and, due to her unstable way of life, her family kept close watch on 
her in order to prevent her from further dishonoring the family. When Thouria finally found a 
prospective groom, a man who was disabled, her family strongly opposed the marriage because 
of the price that the groom’s family would have to pay to her father. As a result, she met with a 
man she knew to be a recruiter of suicide terrorists and began an uninterrupted process toward a 
suicide attack until she was eventually arrested by Israeli police (Schweitzer 2006).xlviii Although 
this woman may not have been completely marginalized in society in the typical sense, she did 
feel like she had no other options for escaping her role in society. Shame and humiliation may 
lead to suicide terrorism, but so can feelings of hopelessness.  
All of these women have been marginalized in their community in some irreversible way, 
mostly for relationships with male companions. However, Arin Ahmad was a twenty year old 
unattached resident of Beit Sakhour when she decided to carry out a suicide attack in Rishon 
LeZion in 2002. Arin was supposed to be involved in a double suicide attack, but she rescinded 
her cooperation at the last minute for moral reasons. Arin claimed that she was depressed and 
hopeless because her boyfriend was killed by Israeli soldiers and therefore wanted to avenge his 
death. It is possible that if she was sexually active with the man she intended on marrying, she 
might have been shunned in her community for not being a virgin after his death. However, 
when Arin joined Tanzim she assumed that the process of committing a suicide attack would 
take a long time, but when Tanzim planned on sending her for an attack within days of her 
commitment to the group, she regretted that Tanzim took advantage of her emotionally fragile 
situation and backed out of the attack. Arin is a rare breed of suicide terrorist, having backed out 
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of the mission for moral reasons; however she is now in Israeli prisons for her activities with 
Tanzim and intent to commit a terrorist attack (Schweitzer 2006).xlix
Wafa al-Bas was another marginalized woman who intended to commit a terrorist attack. 
Wafa was taking advantage of a medical appointment at the Soroka Medical Center in Beersheva 
when she decided to commit her attack. Wafa was due for a check-up after being badly scarred 
on her face and all over her body when a heater in the family’s home exploded. Not 
coincidentally, Wafa’s scars severely hindered her chances of marriage. On the morning of June 
20, 2005, Wafa al-Bas, aged 21, a resident of the Jabalya refugee camp in the northern Gaza 
Strip, came to the Erez road block with ten kilograms of explosives hidden in her underclothes. 
When Wafa felt that she had alerted the Israeli soldiers at the checkpoint, she tried several times 
to activate her belt. When the belt would not detonate she was captured and taken to an Israeli 
prison where she was interviewed by Yoram Schweitzer.  In the beginning, Wafa claimed she 
was under deep emotional stress because of her scars and was tricked into committing an attack. 
Later, after possibly being indoctrinated in prison, she claimed that, as a small child, she had 
always wanted to die for Allah. Wafa also went as far as to say again that explosives were 
secretly planted on her while she was under the influence of drugs in a Palestinian hospital.  The 
parents of Wafa al-Bas attributed her deed to her fear that she would be a financial burden on the 
family and that her death would eventually bring financial compensation to her family from 
Fatah (Schweitzer 2006).l  
Reem Al-Reyashi was affiliated with a terrorist organization before she carried out a 
suicide attack at a border crossing in Jerusalem, Israel. She was the mother of two small children 
and was married to a Hamas operative. Gossip circulated within the community that she had 
committed infidelity with another man, either before or during her marriage to her current 
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husband. After her death, Reem’s parents refused to discuss her martyrdom with reporters and 
they did not arrange a mourning tent for her, a rarity for proud parents of a righteous Muslim. 
Reem’s husband was said to have persuaded her to commit this attack in order for her to atone 
for her disgrace. In doing so, her children’s honor would be restored and she would be accepted 
into paradise (The Washington Times 2004).li
Only recently have suicide bombings subsided in Israel. The decreases in attacks have 
been attributed to the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian people which include 
a cease fire between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian terrorist operatives. In doing so, the number 
of female suicide bombers have decreased significantly. However, if the tensions between 
Israelis and Palestinians escalate and the Palestinians decide to reinitiate their suicide attacks 
against Israeli civilians, female suicide bombers will certainly be employed. If given the 
opportunity, matriarchal conservatives will perpetrate suicide attacks in order to redeem their 
honor in society and terrorist groups will provide these women with the tools necessary to do so. 
The evidence provided does not indicate any participation or involvement in feminist activities 
within the Palestinian Territories. On the contrary, these women have suffered a loss of honor 
and have attempted to redeem it from society when lost. Most of these women were unmarried, 
not educated beyond high school, and were rarely directly affiliated with a terrorist organization. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that these women seek out terrorist operatives only to provide the 
equipment necessary to perform attacks. Some have been accused of committing adultery while 
others have irrevocably damaged their status by getting pregnant out of wedlock. The underlying 
dynamic of matriarchal conservatives who commit suicide attacks is their employment of non-
traditional methods to attain traditional aims.  How ironic is it that if matriarchal conservatives 
lose honor in their communities they will deviate from the conventional views of femininity and 
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humanity in their culture by committing suicide attacks in order to regain status in the very same 
society that has rejected them.  
 
Matriarchal Conservatives Data Set 
Matriarchs  Marital Status  Education  Terrorist 
Group 
Affiliation 
Feminist 
Group 
Affiliation 
Personal 
Honor Status 
Wafa Idris  Divorced  High School  None  None  Dishonored 
Zina  Unmarried  High School  Tanzim  None  Dishonored 
Darine Abu 
Aisha 
Engaged  University   None  None  Dishonored 
Ayat Al‐Akras  Unmarried  High School  None  None  Inconclusive 
Shireen Rabiya  None  Unfinished  None  None   Inconclusive 
Reem Al‐
Reyashi                 
Married    Hamas  None  Dishonored 
Thouria 
Khamour 
Unmarried  Unfinished  None  None  Dishonored 
Arin Ahmad  Unmarried    Tanzim  None  Dishonored 
Wafa Al‐Bas 
 
Unmarried 
                              
  Fatah 
 
None 
 
Dishonored 
 
 
Above is a sample of Palestinian women who have committed or attempted to commit terror 
attacks in Israel. Although there are two instances where it is inconclusive whether or not these 
women have been dishonored in society, none of these women were affiliated with any terror 
organization nor were these women feminists. What this sample proposes is that matriarchal 
conservatism does exist among past female suicide bombers. Moreover, this preliminary research 
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should be considered the initial stages of future research that should be conducted in order to 
reveal matriarchal conservatism in Israel and possibly Iraq. Although it is possible that the 
motivations of Palestinian women that drive them to suicide terror in Palestine is not mono-
causal, a sample that encompasses every attempted and successful female suicide bomber for 
Palestine will determine those theories. However, given the sampling of this data, culture and 
honor is undoubtedly an important factor that drives women to engage in terror.  
Women are important to the understanding of terrorism, but they are still under-studied 
due to their low numbers of participation compared to males. These Palestinian women are not 
leaders in the organizations nor are they planners. These women are not a part of the military 
wing of Fatah’s Tanzim, nor are they a member of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, or Islamic Jihad. 
Their presence in terrorism is creating an advantageous alternative for terror organizations to 
threaten and attack their enemy; instead of using highly trained soldiers they can use women. 
The negative effect of appearing brutish and desperate that terror groups create by using women 
as suicide bombers is outweighed by the media sensation they cause. The participation of these 
women is based on their status in their communities.  
 
Honor Killings (An Alternative Explanation) 
Being outcast from a society may not persuade some women to commit suicide and 
murder, but when faced with being murdered at the hands of a male family member or 
committing suicide, some women choose the latter. Beauty, promiscuity, or even education can 
lead to death from an honor killing. Honor killings are common if hidden fixtures of 
fundamentalist Islamic communities; they are also overlooked as motivating factors for female 
terrorists. The target of an honor killing faces death at the hands of a male relative unless she 
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redeems her honor, perhaps by committing to a martyrs’ death. However, a Palestinian women 
does not have to commit suicide in the name of Islam; she could also regain her honor by being 
caught trying to perpetrate a suicide attack. Some of the women interviewed by Yoram 
Schweitzer were caught while attempting to commit a terrorist attack. Although they are sent to 
prison, their family’s honor was restored and a small sum of money is still given to the 
immediate family. “Immediately after the bombing of Wafa Idris, Wafa’s sister-in-law, Wissim, 
spoke up in a televised statement, saying that Wafa had often told her that it was better to die a 
martyr’s death than to live in humiliation” (Victor 2003, 27). lii According to Barbara Victor, all 
the women she studied (who actually died) had personal problems that made their lives untenable 
within their own culture and society. To Naomi Chazan, an Israeli psychologist, the threat of 
death as moral justification is not hollow. The concept of honor is so embedded in Arab culture 
that honor killings still occur. Chazan implores people not to overlook the severity of honor 
killings. “Don’t make the mistake to assume that honor killings happen only in Gaza or Jenin or 
in Saudi Arabia, I deal with so many young Arab-Israeli women who fear for their lives at the 
hands of their fathers and brothers” (Victor 193).  Thus if a woman has no way to escape her 
destiny she can justify taking the lives of others. Walter Reich even claims that people do not 
ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of 
their actions (Reich 1990, 16).liii  
Every year, it is likely that hundreds of women and girls are murdered in the Middle East 
by family members. Legitimacy for such murders stems from a complex code of honor ingrained 
in the consciousness of men and women in Islamic society. Family status is largely dependent 
upon its honor, much of which is determined by the respectability of the female members, who 
can irreparably damage the status of the family with the perceived misuse of their sexuality. 
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Manal Kleibo Zarf, a female attorney, knows of many honor killings, although she has never 
been asked to prosecute one case. Zarf believes that this is because Jordanian Law still applies to 
the West Bank, Article 341 considers murder a legitimate act of defense when “The act of killing 
another or harming another is committed as an act in defense of his life, or his honor or 
somebody else’s life or honor” (Ruggi 1998, 12).liv Honor killings still remain a private family 
matter- no official statistics are available on the practice or its frequency. According to a 
November 1997 report of the Woman’s Empowerment Project published in Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, 
there were 20 honor killings in Gaza and the West Bank in 1996. One representative of the group 
even added that “We know there are more but no one publicizes it.” The Palestinian Working 
Society states that in 1998 more than 40 women have been killed for honor in Gaza (Ruggi 
1998).lv Honor killings are a motivating factor for women to commit suicide bombings, when 
given the choice between death at your hand or death at the hands of a family member, some 
women may choose the latter. This choice, however, should be stressed. Women are subject to 
the social cleavages of their religion and community, although they may be inadvertently 
pressured to perform attacks, these women still make the choice not only to take their own lives, 
but rather to take their lives as well as the lives of innocent civilians. 
Female Terrorism in Iraq 
 Recent statistics are hard to attain in societies where honor killings are considered a 
closed family matter. However, what are the other implications of honor killings in other Muslim 
societies like Iraq? Honor killings in Iraq are also a common occurrence. In 2007, a 17-year-old 
girl whose religion was Yazidi, a Kurdish religion with origins in Islam and Christianity, was 
dragged into a crowd in a headlock with police looking on. Family members were responsible for 
beating her and then stoning her to death. The Yazidis still observe an ancient Middle Eastern 
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tradition in which mixing with people from other faiths are condemned.  Authorities believe that 
she was killed for being seen with a Sunni Muslim man (Tawfeeq and Todd 2007). lvi  
 In 2008 alone, more than 30 female suicide bombers have detonated themselves in Iraq 
(Tawfeeq 2008).lvii Rania Ibrahim, a 20 year-old woman from the province of Diyala in Iraq was 
the first attempted suicide bomber. She attributed her attempt at suicide and murder to her forced 
marriage to a man 10 years her senior after both her father and brother died. Rania’s status in 
society was destroyed when she lost her male guardians and was thus forced to marry an 
extremist who coerced her into participating in a bombing (Iraq Updates 2008).lviii The most 
recent incident of another suicide bombing was in central Baquba on October 8 2008, killing 
nine people and wounding more than seventeen. An official said the woman, covered in a 
traditional black garment known as an abaya, blew herself up near a security checkpoint outside 
the courthouse. In July of 2008, 3 female bombers struck Kurdish political protesters in Kirkuk 
and Shiite pilgrims in Baghdad, killing at least 48 people and leaving 249 wounded in one of the 
bloodiest sequences of attacks in Iraq. In the attacks in Baghdad, three women used suicide vests 
and a bomb in a bag to make strikes just minutes apart, killing 24 people instantly, all apparently 
Shiite pilgrims marching in a festival, according to an official at the Interior Ministry (Oppel and 
Tavernise 2008).lix Wenza Ali Mutlaq, who was in her 30s and whose attack was captured on a 
security video, was the 18th female suicide bomber to strike in the Diyala Province, which has 
been hit by female attackers much more frequently than any other province of Iraq. So far, 11 of 
the 20 suicide bombings carried out by women in Iraq this year have occurred in Diyala (Rubin 
2008). lx In February 2008 two women were used as suicide bombers in an Iraqi pet market. The 
two women had Down’s syndrome and were detonated from a distance, killing 91 people 
(Fletcher 2008).lxi The family histories of these women are unknown because of the reclusive 
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nature of the communities from which they come. However, these women may have been 
dishonored in their communities. In the case of the two handicapped women, their status in the 
community was clearly not respected as they were used as human bombs, detonated from a cell 
phone by Al-Qaeda members. A psychiatrist, Ahmed Bekka, told Aswat al-Iraq that al-Qaeda 
Organization’s emirs (leaders) used to give some girls hallucinatory pills to guarantee their 
bombing operations would be successful, especially if the women were mentally handicapped 
(Iraq Updates 2008).lxii
Suicide attacks in Israel are intensely publicized by the Israeli government and are hailed 
within the Palestinian communities as acts of honor. Thus it is much simpler to study the life 
stories of the women who commit attacks against Israelis. Such is not the case for the women in 
Iraq. The number of female suicide bomber in Iraq has kept growing over the last few years and 
yet very little is known about the motivations of these women, their group affiliations, or even 
their names. It is more difficult to come to any major conclusion about the details of these 
attacks, so insights are pure conjecture. Because these women are considered “occupied” in the 
American media, there is an assumption they are fighting for liberation from Americans. There is 
no evidence to support that these women are hyper-nationalists, nor is there any support for the 
reasoning that these women are killing American forces in order to gain gender equality ( i.e., in 
some cases these women are attacking fellow Iraqis). Moreover, the women in Iraq who have 
committed suicide attacks, most of whom are from the religious Diyala Province, are most likely 
matriarchal conservatives, in that they would more likely pride Islamic righteousness over 
Western values like equality. Thus, why are these women committing suicide attacks instead of 
being employed as support roles to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda?  During the Algerian 
Revolution in the 1960s, women were in support roles, often being responsible for transporting 
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weaponry and bombs to different locations. On several occasions, women were used to leave 
bombs in areas frequented by the French, like beaches or cafes. In the case of Iraq, however, 
women are not in support roles. On February 3, 2009 a woman was arrested for recruiting 
perhaps dozens of women for suicide bombing missions. The matriarch known as Umm al-
Mumineen was a part of a ploy in which she would seek out troubled women and persuade them 
to commit suicide missions in order to regain their honor. There is also evidence that terrorists, 
working in conjunction with this woman, would target young women in conservative homes and 
rape them in order to ruin their status within the community. The young girls would be sent to 
Umm al-Mumineed for matronly advice where they would then be instructed on how to commit 
a suicide bombing in order to redeem their honor. Whereas the women in the Palestinian 
Territories were sporadically used as suicide bombers, the terrorists in Iraq may be exploiting the 
honor system of Islam in order to make young women suicide terrorists (BBC News).lxiii
Conclusion 
The female suicide bombers in Iraq are subject to the same status quo as the Palestinian 
female suicide bombers in Israel. Honor is still prized above all else, women are subject to the 
deadly threat of gossip and the idea that they can sacrifice their life in order to regain status for 
themselves and their families. Interviews with the family members of these women or with the 
male operatives who supplied these women with explosives are needed to prove these theories. 
Putting aside Western normative opinions of Islamic honor, how does the United States thwart 
the use of female suicide bombers in Iraq? The aim of this research was that, by analyzing and 
understanding the motivations of these women, proper actions can be taken to keep these women 
from performing terror attacks. Women have tactical advantages for committing suicide attacks, 
like hiding a bomb under a hijab or abaya, the look of innocence to get through a checkpoint, and 
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their inherent newsworthiness.  If the American army created new policies by borrowing some of 
Israel’s tactics to thwart female terrorism, female suicide bombings might be reduced. A simple 
initiative like employing female soldiers at checkpoints can deter female terrorists, or American 
forces can support welfare and workers programs outside their original community specifically 
for women. If you take these women away from the threat of an honor killing if humiliated, and 
give them the opportunity to be self-sustaining, these women may not feel forced into becoming 
terrorists. Indeed, an Iraqi psychiatrist who is familiar with the story of Rania Ibrahim, a female 
bomber in Iraq, says that “One of the things that could be done [to deter suicide attacks by 
women] is to trim the volume of women’s unemployment and provide varied jobs for them based 
on their education and qualifications (Iraq Updates 2008).lxiv
In the Bamian province of Afghanistan, war has left women particularly vulnerable. For 
years the women in the Bamian province have been the victims of rape and abduction. Hundreds 
of thousands have been left as widows, mired in a desperate poverty, made worse under Taliban 
rule because they were not allowed to work or leave home unaccompanied by male relatives.lxv 
Now women are driving cars, working in public offices and police stations, and sitting on local 
councils. Most of the people in this province are ethnic Hazaras, Shiite Muslims who were 
opposed to women working outside the home but due to the desperate need of labor, women 
have taken on new roles in society. Women are taking jobs as police officers and are seen taking 
driving lessons, proving it is possible to give opportunities to the women in Iraq. If women are 
given opportunities elsewhere they may not feel trapped to redeem their honor by becoming 
suicide bombers. Giving these women jobs may irritate the community initially, but like the 
village in Afghanistan, the men will adapt to the new situation due to the overwhelming need for 
labor and income. Thus, if American forces supplied the women in Iraq with labor or refugee 
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programs outside their villages, women may not have to resort to suicide terror. In fact, it had 
been found that the higher percentage of women in a country’s labor force, the fewer the number 
of Islamist terror attacks (Robison et al. 2006).lxvi In essence, the women who lose honor in their 
community, if given the opportunity to leave, may choose welfare programs over suicide.  
Matriarchal Conservativism is a paradigm within Islamic culture. These Muslim women 
choose to commit suicide and murder, a fundamental sin in Islam, in order to redeem honor in 
the very religious communities in which they live. The American perception has often resembled 
the idea that “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned,” where women commit attacks for 
nationalism, anger, or perhaps equality, whereas the opposite is true. Matriarchal conservatives 
prize their honor and therefore suffer from its fragile nature. As a result, terrorist organizations 
recognize this opportunity and will refine their use of female bombers if given the opportunity. 
Therefore, if matriarchal conservatives are susceptible to the plotting of male-dominated terrorist 
organizations, counter-terrorism policy needs to also focus on women. We cannot assume that 
matriarchal conservative women want to live as Americans, with the same cultural norms such as 
equality and social freedom. Matriarchal conservatives prize their traditional role in society and 
are not demoralized by fitting into its complex structure. The presence of female suicide bombers 
in martial environments challenges our ill-conceived notions of Arab feminists. Often we 
perceive Arab women as submissive participants in domestic and social life, the existence of 
matriarchal conservatives, however, changes these conceptions of female involvement in warfare 
and by extension, challenges the roles of Arab women in feminism and warfare.  
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